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A model is considered where firms internalize the regret costs that consumers experience when they
see an unexpected price change.  Regret costs are assumed to be increasing in the size of price changes
and this can explain why the size of price increases is less sensitive to inflation than in models with
fixed costs of changing prices. The latter predict unrealistically large responses of price changes to
inflation for firms that do not frequently reduce their prices. Adjustment costs that depend on the size
of price changes also raise the variability on the size of price increases. Lastly, it is argued that the
common practice of announcing price increases in advance is much easier to rationalize with regret
concerns by consumers than with more standard approaches to price rigidity.
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jrotemberg@hbs.eduPrice changes can trigger consumer regret. If a good is storable and people notice an
increase in its price, they are likely to regret not having purchased earlier, while they regret
not having waited if they see a price decline. Even for non-storable goods, a price increase
can trigger regret if individuals were savoring anticipatory utility before the purchase. These
anticipations might make it di±cult for consumers not to buy, so they experience regret at
having indulged in these anticipations earlier. The purpose of this paper is to study how
¯rms should change their prices if they seek to act as if they empathized with these regret
costs of their consumers.
While it does not directly absorb scarce physical resources, the regret experienced as a
result of a price change is a cost, and the analysis is thus conducted as a comparison of
regret costs with the ¯xed costs of price adjustment postulated in the in°uential papers of
Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) and Golosov and Lucas (2007). There are two ways in which
regret costs can be expected to di®er from simple ¯xed costs. The ¯rst is that these costs
ought to depend on the size of price changes, with regret presumably being larger when prices
are changed by larger amounts. The second is that these costs can be reduced if people are
told about future price changes in advance.
These two simple and intuitive properties of regret have several implications for the
pricing by ¯rms that act as if they empathized with their consumers' sentiments. The
dependence of regret costs on the size of price adjustment makes ¯rms less willing to institute
large price changes. This matters in two contexts. The ¯rst is the e®ect of in°ation on the
size of price changes. In the Sheshinki and Weiss (1977) model, an increase in in°ation leads
¯rms to post substantially larger price increases whenever they do decide to raise their price.
In practice, however, several papers have shown that the actual size of price increases rises
only modestly when in°ation rises. The lack of dependence of price changes on in°ation is
visible already in the early work on magazine prices by Checchetti (1986). It is brought to
light even more clearly in Kashyap's (1995) study of catalog prices, in Goette, Minsch and
Tyran (2005) analysis of Swiss restaurant data and in the Mexican and Norwegian price
index studies carried out by Gagnon (2007) and Wulfsberg (2008) respectively.
1Gagnon (2007) argues that the lack of substantial changes in the size of price increases
when in°ation rises does not constitute evidence against ¯xed costs of changing prices. He
shows, in particular, that a model with ¯xed costs of changing prices predicts a modest e®ect
of in°ation on the size of price increases as long as individual ¯rm productivity is random,
as in Golosov and Lucas (2007). A key condition for this result to be valid, however, is that
all ¯rms have the same price adjustment parameters so that the probability that any given
¯rm will lower its price conditional on a price change is equal to the fraction of total price
changes that is made up of price reductions. In practice, however, the frequency of price
adjustment varies a great deal across ¯rms and declines are much more common among ¯rms
that change their prices frequently. This bears on the e®ect of in°ation on the size of price
changes for two reasons. First, the size of price increases is more sensitive to in°ation for
¯rms that adjust their prices less frequently. Second, and this is a somewhat subtler point,
the relationship between the the frequency of price adjustment and the response of the size
of price increases to in°ation is convex. This occurs, in part, because a one percent change
in annual in°ation has a negligible e®ect on the size of the price changes of ¯rms that adjust
their prices continuously. As a result of this convexity, in°ation raises the size of the average
price increase by more than it raises the price increases of ¯rms whose prices are adjusted
at the average frequency.
Relative to ¯xed costs, regret costs reduce the extent to which ¯rms with infrequent
price changes let the size of their price increases respond to in°ation. The reason is that an
increase in the delay between price adjustments requires a larger price increase (and hence
more regret) when in°ation is higher. As a result, rises in in°ation lead altruistic ¯rms to
reduce these delays, and this dampens the size of their price increases. Interestingly, this
e®ect can be so large that increases in in°ation lead ¯rms to reduce the size of their price
increases. This result my be of empirical relevance because Wulfsberg (2008) shows that the
size of many Norwegian price increases rose when in°ation fell after the 1980's.
When ¯rms see larger price changes as more costly, their prices have another desirable
property. This is that, relative to a ¯xed costs of price adjustment model that induces the
2same average price increases, there is more dispersion in these increases. This result may
seem surprising since it might be felt that the desire to avoid regret leads all price changes
to be consistently smaller. This is true for any given stochastic environment faced by ¯rms.
However, to be consistent both with the average magnitude of price increases and with the
proportion of prices changes that are price reductions, one must make the environment faced
by ¯rms with regret costs more volatile. What happens, then, is that ¯rms with regret costs
institute only small price changes when in°ation erodes their price for a given level of their
real costs. On the other hand, they are forced to make larger price changes when they are hit
by the large changes in real costs that are necessary to account for their average behavior.
A somewhat di®erent advantage of interpreting the costs of price adjustment as customer
costs of regret is that one can then explain why ¯rms warn customers in advance of price
changes. A preannouncement of this sort would seem to have the potential to ameliorate
two regret costs. First, it would urge customers who would be upset at paying a higher price
later to purchase immediately and thereby avoid some of the costs of the price increase.
Second, it could reduce the number of people who are surprised when they see the higher
price, and thereby reduce the number of people who obtained anticipatory utility on the
basis of imagining that they would obtain the good for less.
Since this paper does not derive regret costs from ¯rst principles, it cannot address the
question of how much regret costs fall when ¯rms announce their price changes in advance.
What the paper does show is that altruistic ¯rms do sometimes (though not always) bene¯t
from preannouncements if these reduce regret costs. At the same time, the paper emphasizes
that preannouncements of price increases reduce ¯rm pro¯ts in more traditional models of
price rigidity. What happens in these models is that ¯rms make more pro¯ts at the \new"
prices than at the old, so they should not encourage their customers to stockpile goods at
the old price.1 Therefore, the existence of these preannouncements provides at least some
1Encouraging customers to stockpile items in advance of price increases also seems inconsistent with
models where ¯rms keep their prices rigid because they lack su±cient information to change them (see, for
example Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Woodford (2008)). Once the ¯rm learns its price is no longer optimal,
there seems to be little reason to help customers buy more at a non-pro¯t maximizing price.
3evidence for the importance of psychic costs that are not incorporated in standard models
of price rigidity.
This paper studies implications of a model whose assumptions are meant to be somewhat
appealing from an intuitive point of view, and does not discuss the psychological evidence
underlying the consumer attitudes that motivate the analysis. It also does not explain why
¯rms internalize the regret that consumers potentially experience so that they set their prices
treating this regret as a cost. Rotemberg (2008) provides a general discussion of the empirical
evidence of regret in purchase situations. Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) provide an elegant
model of disappointment where consumers are disappointed when the price is higher than
their anticipation of what this price will be. One important di®erence between their work
and what is discussed here is that they suppose that this disappointment is eliminated if
consumers do not purchase, and this can lead sales to fall sharply when prices are raised. I
suppose, by contrast, that regret (at either not having purchased before or at having formed
excessively optimistic forecasts of future prices) persists whether the consumer purchases
or not. As a result, the level of purchases is based on a standard consumer optimization
problem.
A model of the transmission of customer emotions such as regret to ¯rm actions is pre-
sented in Rotemberg (2004). While it motivates what is done here, the results in this paper
can also be seen as being based on a \reduced form" that may be derived in other ways.
In any event, the model of Rotemberg (2004) leads ¯rms to follow consumer wishes for fear
of being found to be insu±ciently altruistic towards them. One empirical advantage of this
interpretation is that consumers do sometimes lash out against ¯rms, and ¯rms do seem to
take actions to avoid this.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section considers deterministic models to show
that the dependence of adjustment costs on the size of price adjustment can explain why
in°ation has modest e®ects on the size of price increases. Section 2 turns its attention to
a model with stochastic technology inspired by Golosov and Lucas (2007). It contains two
parts. The ¯rst discusses the extent to which such a model can explain the empirical link
4between in°ation and the size of price increases. The second shows that the dependence
of costs of adjustment on the size of price changes can, for a given degree of price rigidity,
increase the variability of price increases. Section 3 studies price preannouncements and
Section 4 o®ers some concluding remarks.
1 The size of price increases with deterministic in°a-
tion and technology
1.1 Continuous time
Most of the results presented in this paper are derived from numerical exercises carried out
with discrete time models. Nonetheless, it is worth starting with a deterministic continuous
time model that is close to Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) because this model is analytically
more tractable and can therefore provide intuition for the numerical results that follow.
Let pt be the nominal price charged by the ¯rm at t and let pt¡ be the limit of the price
charged at time x when x approaches t from below. Consumers are assumed to incur the cost
`(pt;pt¡) whenever pt is not equal to pt¡. Consistent with the discussion in the introduction,
these costs are assumed to depend on the size of price changes, with price reductions being
costly as well.
Purchases are assumed to be made continuously with no possibility of storage (this is
relaxed below). Leaving aside the costs of regret, which are assumed not to a®ect purchase
decisions, consumers obtains the following utility by purchasing a sequence of qt units of a











where µ is a parameter. The presence of the numeraire good makes it easier to isolate
what occurs in a single market; a more complete model would treat all goods symmetrically
instead. The price of the numeraire good, pzt grows at the instantaneous rate ¹ while
consumers have access to an asset with an instantaneous nominal rate of interest of i. Letting
5A denote the consumers' assets and _ A their time derivative,
_ A = iA ¡ ptqt ¡ pztzt + It
where It represents non-asset income. It follows that, unless i = r + ¹ individuals will not
consume z smoothly over time. If this condition is satis¯ed, by contrast, individuals are
indi®erent as to when they consume z. Individuals can then reach their maximum utility
by setting zt equal to ¹ z ¡ ptqt=pzt where ¹ z is the annuity value of lifetime wealth in terms
of good z, which equals r[A0 +
R 1


















Consumer optimization then implies that qt = (pt=pzt)¡µ so that µ is the elasticity of demand.
With a mass N of consumers, total demand is given by Qt = N(pt=pzt)¡µ. Given this level
of purchases, (1) implies that each individual's instantaneous utility from consuming the

















To ensure that ¯rms do not change prices at every instant, the function ` is assumed to
have a positive limit as pt goes to pt¡ from above, even though `(x;x) = 0. The existence of
such ¯xed psychological costs allows one to interpret the rigidity of prices as due exclusively
to consumer psychology. If ¯xed psychological costs are regarded as implausible, the model
can be interpreted as one that has both administrative and psychological costs of price
changes, with the former being ¯xed and the latter being variable. Because administrative
costs of changing prices are unlikely to depend on the size of the price change, the aspects
of the model that hinge on this variability seem most easily interpreted as being due to the
psychological forces that I stress.
The instantaneous cost of producing the good is cpzt so that this cost rises at the general
rate of in°ation ¹. Instantaneous pro¯ts at t in terms of the numeraire good thus equal
N(pt=pzt)¡µ[(pt=pzt) ¡ c]. A ¯rm that acts as if it had an altruism parameter of ¸ towards
6its consumers maximizes the sum of the present value of its pro¯ts and ¸ times consumer








¡r^ ti`(p^ ti;p^ ti¡) (3)
where W(y) ´ N
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and the ^ ti represent the dates where the ¯rm changes its prices.
To ensure stationarity, let ` depend on (pt¡pt¡)=pt¡. This implies that the time between
price changes, ¿, remains constant over time. Each time the ¯rm sets a new price, it chooses
the same real price S = pt=pzt so that its price rises by 100(e¹¿ ¡ 1) percent. The variables
















¡(r+¹)tdt = 0; (5)
so that the present value of the bene¯t of raising the price slightly has to be equal to zero
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0 = W(S) ¡ W(Se
¡¹¿): (7)
In the case where `0 = 0, this equation is identical to the equation in Sheshinski and
Weiss (1977). It then states that the di®erence between ¯rm welfare at the reset price S
and ¯rm welfare at the terminal price s = Se¡¹¿ equals the interest rate times the cost of
price adjustment (which is ¸` when `0 = 0). The intuition for this is that the product of
the interest rate and the cost of adjustment is the bene¯t of postponing the adjustment of
7prices by a small amount of time, and that, at an optimum, this ought to equal the cost of
doing so.
Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) prove a quite general result, namely that increases in in°ation
raise the size of price adjustments e¹¿. Intuition for this result can be readily obtained from
Figure 1, which depicts both the objective function W as a function of price as well and
the pattern of price adjustment. The reset price S is above the price p¤ that maximizes W.
After being set equal to S, the real price is allowed to decline with in°ation until it reaches
Se¡¹¿, with the vertical distance between the initial and ¯nal W's being equal to r¸` when
costs are purely ¯xed. Now suppose that in°ation rises to ¹0 and imagine that the ¯rm were
to keep the size of the price increase the same (so that it now keeps its price constant for a
period of length ¿0 with ¿0¹0 = ¿¹). Higher in°ation would reduce the time it takes for prices
to reach p¤ after the price is set to S. This matters because, after this point, W 0 is positive,
and the fact that these points are reached faster implies that they receive a higher weight
in (5), the present value of W 0 that must be zero at an optimal price. Since the limits of
integration are unchanged if the interval between prices becomes ¿0, it follows that the ¯rm
now wants to start with a price higher than S. Given the required relation between pro¯ts
at the starting and ending price, the ¯rm must end with a lower price so that the size of
price increases is higher.
In the case where adjustment costs are psychological and `0 is positive, an increase in
in°ation has the additional e®ect of lowering the left hand side of (7) for a given ¿. The ¯rm
thus acts as if its costs of price adjustment were lower when in°ation is higher. This induces
more frequent adjustments and tends to reduce the size of price increases. The intuition for
this e®ect is simple. When in°ation is higher, postponing a price increase by a given amount
of time raises regret costs ` by more (because a postponement by a given amount of time
dt requires a larger increase in price). Thus, an altruistic ¯rms has an incentive to raise the
frequency of its price adjustments.
81.2 Discrete time
This e®ect of in°ation can be quantitatively important. To demonstrate this, I turn to a
version of the model where decisions are made once per time period and time periods have
discrete length. The variables pt, qt, i and pzt continue to represent, respectively, the price
and individual consumption of the good under study, the one period interest rate and the
price of the numeraire at t. Letting ½ be the rate at which consumers discount payo®s one











t+j + zt+j ¡ `(pt+j=pt+j¡1)
!
;
while each consumer's assets at t, At equal
At = (1 + i)At¡1 ¡ pt(~ qt + ^ qt+1) ¡ pztzt;
where ~ qt are the purchases of the good at t for consumption at t and ^ qt+1 are the purchases of
the good at t for use at t+1. For the moment, I set qt = ~ qt and ^ qt = 0 so that purchases for
inventory are ignored. This is relaxed when I consider preannouncements below. To avoid a
strict preference for zero consumption of zt at certain points, it must be the case that
½(1 + i) = (1 + ¹); (8)
where ¹ is the one period rate of growth of pzt, and I assume this from now on. This condition
ensures that consumers are indi®erent as to when they consume good z. Consumer demand
qt is then equal to (p=pz)¡µ once again and single-period utility from having access to this
good at price p=pzt equals (p=pz)1¡µ=(µ¡1). With a constant real marginal cost of production
c, a ¯rm which behaves as if it cared ¸ times as much about consumer utility as about its
own pro¯ts has the same one-period objective as before. I now write it as
N









































9I normalize N so that N(µ+¸¡1)=(µ¡1) equals one. If the ¯rm keeps its price constant
for J periods starting in period 0, it incurs its next adjustment cost in period J. Supposing
it raises its real price to S whenever it changes it, the present value of its welfare is
U =
PJ¡1
j=0 ½jW(S=(1 + ¹)j)


































µ + ¸ ¡ 1
PJ¡1
j=0 ½j(1 + ¹)µj
PJ¡1
j=0 ½j(1 + ¹)(µ¡1)j:
It is convenient at this point to normalize c by setting µc=(µ + ¸ ¡ 1) equal to one. This
has the advantage that the optimal price equals one in the absence of in°ation, and that
departures from one are a measure of the e®ect of in°ation on S. Using this normalization





j=0 ½j(1 + ¹)µj
i1¡µ hPJ¡1
j=0 ½j(1 + ¹)(µ¡1)j
iµ
¡ ½JL
1 ¡ ½J : (12)
Using this equation, it is straightforward to ¯nd the numerical values of J that maximize
this objective for given parameter values. I conduct several such experiments for di®erent
values of in°ation and for di®erent degrees of sensitivity of regret to the size of price increases.
The normalizations ensure that, for given µ, ¸ a®ects the ¯rm's price only through L so that
its main role here is to determine the extent to which the ¯rm perceives the regret cost of its
customers. Notice also that in (9), L is in the same units as the one period revenues that the
¯rm derives from one customer (pt=pzt)1¡µ. This facilitates the interpretation of this cost.
The two remaining parameters of the model are ½ and µ. In the simulations, these are
set to the values used in Nakamura and Steinsson (2007) so that ½ equals .96 at annual rates
and µ equals 4. In this section, a period is taken to be a day (so that ¯rms can in principle
change their prices daily). The results is that the ½ used in these simulations is :961=365,
10and similarly single period in°ation ¹ satis¯es (1 + ¹) = (1 + ¼)1=365 where ¼ is the annual
in°ation rate.
Consistent with the idea that both price increases and decreases cause some distress, the
¯rm's perceived cost of price adjustment, L is given by





















where L0 and L1 are parameters and It is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if pt
di®ers from pt¡1. The assumption that this function is fully symmetric is made for simplicity.
Results from simulating this model are reported in Figures 2-4. Each ¯gure contains
four speci¯cations for these costs, where these speci¯cations di®er both in L0 and L1. What
the speci¯cations in each ¯gure have in common is the size of price changes at the baseline
in°ation rate of 2.4%. Thus, the L0's in each ¯gure can be thought of as having been chosen
so that, for the L1's being considered, each induces the same price changes when in°ation is
2.4%. Since price changes are common at this baseline in°ation rate, the ¯gures allow one
to understand the implications of di®erent L's for the e®ect of in°ation increases on price
changes. The baseline price increases used as illustrations in the ¯gures have, in turn, been
chosen because they have been observed in empirical studies.
Figure 2 considers speci¯cations where price increases equal 23.5% when in°ation equals
2.4%. This speci¯cation is inspired by Cecchetti's (1986) study of magazine prices. His data
show that, on average, price increases for his sample of magazines equalled 23.5% in the
1960's when in°ation averaged 2.4%. Cecchetti (1986) reports that an average of 7 years
elapsed between price adjustments and that the size of the adjustments he observed matched
closely the aggregate in°ation that took place since the last time these prices were adjusted.
This suggests that, if there were any price declines at all, they must have been extremely
rare. While this does not justify using a deterministic model to try to match his observations,
it at least suggests a bene¯t of trying to explain them with models that, like those in this
section, imply the absence of price declines.
The costs of adjustment that are necessary to rationalize these large price increases
11are much larger than the costs that are contemplated in the other two ¯gures. As Figure 2
indicates, one can explain the price rigidity of magazines with a ¯xed cost of price adjustment
equal to 35.6 times (daily) revenue.2 Since the price in question is the newstand price of
magazines, and magazines also receive revenue from subscriptions and advertisements, this
represents a much smaller fraction of total daily magazine revenue. Still, it represents a
substantial fraction of the expenditure on newstand magazines. With a ¸ equal to one,
consumers would have to su®er disappointment costs from price increases that are essentially
the same as the monthly price of a magazine, and these psychological costs need to be larger
still if ¸ is lower. One potential explanation for such large disappointment costs is that price
increases may lead consumers to regret not having obtained a subscription or not having
brought alternate reading material with them. While uncomfortably high, these costs may
be more believable than the administrative costs of changing prices. As Cecchetti (1986)
argues, these are likely to be low for magazines because their price is literally printed anew
in each issue.
If one views these costs as ¯xed administrative costs, an additional problem emerges.
This is that the size of prices increases did not rise substantially in the 1970's. The average
in°ation rate in this period was 7.1%. According to the ¯gure, price increases should thus
have risen to equal 35.9% if this model were valid with ¯xed costs of changing prices. Instead,
Cecchetti (1986) shows that price increases rose only to 25.3%. The ¯gure also displays the
predicted changes in the size of price increases when costs of price adjustment depend on
the size of the price increase. The bottom-most line in the ¯gure displays the prediction
of setting L1 equal to the value of 1000, and this parameter actually leads predicted price
increases to decline. The line with L1 = 800 predicts a price increase of 25.4% when in°ation
is 7.1%, so a parameter in this range can explain the behavior of magazine price increases.
Still the implied level of regret costs are very sensitive to the size of price adjustments. The
particular functional form for regret costs in (13) implies that the elasticity of regret costs
2This value does depend on the other parameters of the model. It is lower if the elasticity of demand µ
is lower, for example.
12with respect to (1+¹)J is L1((1+¹)J=(L0+L1((1+¹)J ¡1)). This expression equals about
4.6 for the line with L1 = 800 when these costs are evaluated at the 2.4% in°ation rate.
Figure 3 and 4 focuses on somewhat more °exible prices. The former studies environ-
ments where price increases equal 9.9% at the baseline in°ation rate. This is the size of
price increases found by Wulfsberg (2008) in Norwegian CPI data from 1990 to 2004 (when
in°ation in Norway equaled 2.4% on average). It is also close to the size of price increases
reported in Golosov and Lucas (2007). Given that the model involves no price declines, a
price increase of 9.9% still involves periods of rigid prices that last four years. Instead, Figure
4 considers parameters L0 and L1 that yield price changes once a year. Bils and Klenow
(2004) as well as Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) report more frequent changes when looking
at the full population of prices in the the US CPI, while Dhyne et al. (2006) report somewhat
less frequent adjustment in European CPI data.3 What is certain is that di®erent sectors
behave quite di®erently with respect to price adjustment so that many prices are changed
more frequently than this while others are more rigid.
One obvious implication of looking at prices that are adjusted more frequently is that
the ¯xed cost of adjustment that are needed to rationalize this rigidity is lower. A less
obvious result is that a smaller slope L1 is needed to rationalize declines in the size of price
increases when in°ation rises. This is a useful result because Wulfsberg (2008) shows that
the size of typical price increases was about 2.3% lower in the period 1975-1989 when average
in°ation in Norway was equal to 8.4%. As shown in the ¯gure, one can obtain declines of
roughly this magnitude by letting L1 be equal to about 550. It should be noted, however,
that while this derivative of L with respect to (1 + ¹)J is lower than what was needed
to rationalize Cecchetti's (1986) ¯nding, the elasticity of these regret costs with respect to
(1 + ¹)J evaluated at an in°ation of 2.4% is around 10.9 in this case.
3Other studies that have found prices to be rigid for around a year include Blinder et al. (1988) and
Gopinath and Rigobon (2008).
132 Stochastic costs of production
As emphasized by Golosov and Lucas (2007) a model where positive in°ation is the only
force leading ¯rms to change prices cannot explain the behavior of all prices. The reason
is that one observes many price declines. So, at least some ¯rms face cost declines rather
than cost increases. Golosov and Lucas (2007) propose to model this as a mean reverting
stochastic process for the technology of each individual ¯rm, and this approach has been
followed, among others, by Midrigan (2008), Gagnon (2007) and Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008). In this section, I use a variant of this model to study two questions. The ¯rst concerns
how the connection between in°ation and the mean size of price increases is a®ected by the
introduction of this random technology. The second is the e®ect of adjustment cost on other
aspects of the distribution of price changes.
2.1 The connection between in°ation and the size of price in-
creases with ¯xed costs
Gagnon (2007) shows that a model that is quite close to that of Golosov and Lucas (2007)
implies that the size of price increases rises only very slightly when in°ation rises. Gagnon
(2007) corroborates this prediction with Mexican data. Unlike the Norwegian data of Wulfs-
berg (2008), Gagnon's (2007) Mexican data does not show the size of price increases declining
with in°ation. Still, the e®ect of in°ation is much more modest than is implied by the de-
terministic model considered in the previous section and Gagnon (2007) rightly points out
that the capacity of explaining this fact is an impressive accomplishment for the model with
random technology.
What this evidence shows is that the changes in the size of price increases are consistent
with a model where all ¯rms have the same stochastic technology and ¯xed costs of changing
prices. One di±culty with this approach, however, is that it has been widely recognized that
¯rms di®er a great deal in the extent to which their prices are rigid. For ¯rms whose prices
are °exible, one does not need a model of price rigidity. One is then left with the question
whether the evidence is consistent with a model where the ¯rms whose price is relatively
14rigid have ¯xed costs of changing prices (and stochastic technology). This section takes a
modest step towards answering this question. It shows that, even with stochastic technology,
¯rms that face substantial ¯xed costs of changing prices behave in a manner that is quite
similar to the ¯rms considered in the previous section: their prices always increase and never
fall, and the size of their price increases is quite sensitive to in°ation.
Following Golosov and Lucas (2007), marginal cost is now assumed to equal c=at where
at is an index of technology that evolves according to




t is an i.i.d. normal random variable with standard deviation ¾a while ± is a coe±cient
smaller than 1. This implies that W, the one period payo® to the ¯rm leaving outside




















where this payo® has been written so that it incorporates the normalizations N = (µ ¡
1)=(µ + ¸ ¡ 1 and c = (µ + ¸ ¡ 1)=µ. The ¯rm arrives at t with a pre-existing real price























where the cost Lt is given by (13) so that it equals zero if pt is set equal to pt¡1. This
optimization is solved by value function iteration on a grid. To keep the optimization problem
manageable, the length of the period is set equal to a month. Adjacent points on the (log)
grid for real prices di®er by .002, which is the baseline deterministic in°ation rate of pzt and
corresponds to an annual in°ation rate of 2.4%.4
Following Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), ± is set equal to .66. The parameters that still
need to be calibrated are then ¾a, L0 and L1. To consider the case of ¯xed costs, I abstract
from L1 at ¯rst. I then set ¾a and L0 so that the model reproduces two key statistics.
4The programs to carry out this optimization were adapted from those used by Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008).
15These are the fraction of price changes that are increases, which is used in the Nakamura
and Steinsson's (2008) calibration, and the average size of price increases, which is used in
the calibration of Golosov and Lucas (2007). The average size of price increases is set at
9.9% once again5 and the fraction of price changes that are increases is set to the value of
.65 found by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). The resulting values of ¾a and L0 as well as
some additional statistics from this baseline simulation are reported in the ¯rst column of
Table 1. One additional dimension in which the simulation performs well is that prices are
predicted to change in 8.2% of the observations, which is close to the value of 8.4% found
by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) in US CPI data.6
The second column reports the e®ects of keeping all the parameters at their baseline
values and raising the annual in°ation rate to 10%. Consistent with the ¯ndings of Gagnon
(2007), the average size of price increases rises only modestly. Here it rises by about 1%. By
contrast, there are more substantial increases in both the overall frequency of price changes
and the fraction of these changes that is made up of price increases. This result may suggest
that the implications of the deterministic model of section 1 are not relevant.
Column 3 shows, however, that this result hinges a great deal on the fact that every
good is predicted to have both price increases and price declines. As suggested earlier, the
Cecchetti (1986) magazine price data appears to include few if any price declines. Similarly,
there appear to be e®ectively no declines in the restaurant data presented in Goette, Minsch
and Tyran (2005). Like magazines, these prices are quite rigid with an elapsed time between
price changes of around six quarters. In fact, the model with ¯xed costs of changing prices
that I have been studying does predict that, for a given stochastic process for at, price declines
should essentially disappear from sample paths if the cost of changing prices is su±ciently
high.
This is demonstrated in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1, where I simulate a ¯rm that is
5Golosov and Lucas (2007) use 9.5%.
6This match is not entirely surprising since Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) use this overall frequency
to calibrate their parameters and I use the ± from their study. The simulation statistics are obtained by
constructing a stochastic sample path of 10 million observations.
16subject to the same stochastic process for a as the ¯rms in columns 1 and 2 but whose L0 is
set equal to .125. This is a value that is close to the minimum one that ensures that prices
only rise whether yearly in°ation equals 2.4 or 10%. Column 3 considers the case where this
¯rm faces a 2.4% in°ation rate. While it never lowers its prices, the size of its average price
increases is essentially the same as that for ¯rms in column 1, where the adjustment cost is
much smaller. As adjustment costs increase, the ¯rm becomes more reluctant to lower prices
and this reduces its incentive to raise prices by more (because of the fear of being stuck with
a price that is too high if a rises).
Column 4 then simulates the actions of ¯rms with L0 = :125 in an environment where
pzt grows at 10% per year. This change in in°ation raises the size of price increases from
9.9% to 15.9% very much in line with the deterministic results.7 Thus, Goette, Minsch and
Tyran's (2005) evidence that Swiss restaurants (who rarely if ever cut prices) kept the size
of their price changes constant when in°ation changed also constitutes evidence against this
stochastic version of a ¯xed cost of price adjustment model.8
What keeps price increases from rising with in°ation when L1 = 0 as in the speci¯cations
in columns 1 and 2 appears to be the fact that the ¯rm has the option of eliminating its price
reductions when in°ation rises. This is shown more generally in Figure 5. This Figure depicts
the connection between a ¯rm's adjustment frequency, its fraction of price declines, and the
responsiveness of its price increases to in°ation. The Figure is constructed by keeping the
demand and technology parameters the same and considering ¯rms that di®er only in their
L0. Higher values of L0 lead to a lower frequency of price adjustment, and this frequency
(at 2.4% annual in°ation) is used as the x-axis for the plots. The bottom plot shows that
¯rms with higher adjustment costs are less likely to cut their prices (again at 2.4% annual
in°ation.) Since in°ation is positive, they prefer letting their real prices erode by doing
nothing. The top plot, meanwhile shows that the change in the size of the price increase
7In Figure 3 a change in in°ation from 2.4 to 10% leads the size of price increases to go from 9.9% to
16.3%.
8The same is true for the evidence in Kashyap (1995). Declines constitute only 8 percent of his sample
of price changes and yet he observes no di®erence between the size of price increases in the 1970's and the
size of price increases in the 50's, 60's or 80's.
17induced by going for a 2.4 to a 10% annual in°ation rate. The plot shows that ¯rms that cut
their prices frequently have price increases that are nearly una®ected by in°ation. For ¯rms
that raise their prices between 50 and 65% of the time that they institute a price change,
the induced rise in the size of their price increases hovers between 0 and 1%.
By contrast, the proportion of price decreases becomes more important as it falls below
around 35%, and ¯rms with fewer price reductions let the size of their price increases be
a®ected more by in°ation. The e®ect of in°ation is particularly dramatic for ¯rms with very
infrequent price adjustments. Given the convexity of this plot, it seems fair to conclude
that the average across ¯rms of the increase in the size of price increases should exceed the
increase of a ¯rm whose frequency of price adjustment is the average one. To determine the
exact prediction of the model one would have to know how many ¯rms fall in each category.
Unfortunately, we do not even know the behavior of ¯rms whose prices are adjusted at the
average frequency. In the simulations of the calibrated model, the typical ¯rm is assumed to
have the average frequency of price changes as well as the average fraction of price increases.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that the overall fraction of price changes that are decreases
(35%) is signi¯cantly in°uenced by ¯rms whose prices are °exible, since their prices are more
likely to be observed changing. So, it is possible that a very large fraction of ¯rms mostly
raise their prices but that they change their prices su±ciently rarely that they contribute a
disproportionately small amount to the overall volume of changes. In this case, the model
would predict very substantial increases in the average size of price when in°ation rises.
2.2 Adjustment costs that rise with the size of the adjustment
This section reintroduces L1 > 0, this time into the model with stochastic a. I start by
considering the case where L1 = :5. Because this is a monthly model, the corresponding
values for a daily model like that of Section 1 would be around 15, which is still smaller than
most values considered in that section. The ¯rst column of Table 2 uses the parameters L0
and ¾a that ful¯lled the two calibration criteria in the case where L1 was set to zero. I start
with these parameters because, by allowing for a simple comparison with the case where
18L1 = 0, they help provide intuition for the e®ect of L1
The ¯rst column of Table 2 indicates that adding the cost L1 = :5 while keeping all
other parameters the same reduces the size of price increases while also reducing the overall
frequency of price adjustment. This combination of e®ects may seem surprising, so Figure 6
provides some intuition.
This ¯gure depicts slices of the policy functions that result from setting L1 equal to either
zero or .5. Both panels of this ¯gure show the price that ¯rms would charge as a function
of the price they inherit when log(a) is equal to .09. Recall that that overall mean of log(a)
is zero so these slices involves relatively favorable technology. Two di®erences are apparent
from this Figure. The ¯rst is that the model with L1 = :5 has two di®erent reset prices
rather than one. A ¯rm with L1 > 0 that is changing its price because it inherits a price
that is too low does not (unlike the case where L1 = 0) set the same price as a ¯rm that ¯nds
itself with a price that is too high. The reason, of course, is that such a ¯rm su®ers when
its price changes are large and is able to reduce these costs by making smaller adjustments.
The second di®erence is that the band of inaction is somewhat longer in the case where
L1 = :5. In particular, ¯rms with this L1 allow their price to climb higher before they
lower it. Particularly when a is temporarily high so that it is likely to fall (leading to a
higher desired price) small price reductions appear not to be that valuable. These ¯rms thus
institute them only when their current price is further out of line from their desired price.
The second of these features implies both that price decreases are less common (because
¯rms wait longer to institute them) and that price increases are less common (because it
is less likely that ¯rms will use price increases to o®set recent price reductions that were
followed by declines in technology). Price increases are also made less common by the fact
that price declines, when they occur, are smaller. On the other hand, the fact that price
increases are smaller means that a price increase is likely to be followed sooner by the need
to raise price again. This last e®ect, however, appears to be smaller than the other two since
the actual frequency of price increases also declines somewhat when L1 = :5.
The net e®ect of all this is that the simulations in the ¯rst column of Table 2 do not satisfy
19the target criteria: the size of price increases is too small and the fraction of price increases
is too large. Keeping ¾a the same, one can ¯t the size of price increases by raising L0. This
increase in the cost of changing prices leads ¯rms to be even more unwilling to cut prices,
however, so that the fraction of price declines diminishes further. As already indicated, this
is not really drawback from an empirical point of view since sectors like magazines have
both infrequent price declines and large price increases. Still, if one wants all ¯rms to have
the same parameters while keeping the fraction of price increases equal to 65%, one must
increase the variability of technology. The set of parameters ¾a and L0 that matches the two
target moments is displayed in column 2 of Table 2 and ¾a is now considerably larger.
The need to increase ¾a as L1 is increased so as to keep the fraction of price increases
at 65% limits the possibility of conducting numerical exercises with large values of L1. The
reason is that increases in L1 now require larger grids of prices, and the size of the resulting
grids quickly creates numerical problems. The result is that, for the values of L1 that I was
able to study, the e®ect of in°ation on the size of price increases remains modest. This is
shown in column 3 of Table 2, which demonstrates that the size of price increases does not
change signi¯cantly when in°ation is raised to 10% per annum.
While the requirement that ¾a rise to ensure that prices decline when L1 > 0 limits the
scope of the analysis, it does have an interesting and potentially important consequence. This
is that the variability of the size of price changes is increased. This can be seen by comparing
column 2 of Table 2 with column 1 of Table 1, both of which ¯t the target moments when
in°ation is 2.4%. The latter, however, exhibits a 15% larger standard deviation of price
increases and nearly a doubling in the (admittedly small) proportion of prices increases that
exceed 15%.
Among the 12 products considered in Kashyap (1988), a substantial fraction had price
increases of less than 3% about 30% of the time while more than 10% of their increases
exceeded 15%. As he notes, the dispersion of price increases observed in his data represented
a challenge to models of ¯xed costs of changing prices.9 If ¯rms sometimes raise their prices
9See also Carlton (1986).
20by small amounts, and these small amounts represent the size of their bands of inaction,
then they should keep their prices constant only when they are subject to minuscule changes
in cost. This seems di±cult to reconcile with the observation of large price changes, unless
costs are quite variable. But, if costs are so variable, why are prices typically constant
for such long periods of time. The ¯xed cost model thus seems inconsistent with long
periods of price rigidity that are interrupted by price changes of extremely variable size.
Some solutions have been o®ered, including that costs of adjustment vary randomly over
time (Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999)), that ¯rms use a stochastic device to learn when
price adjustments might be appropriate (Woodford 2008), that customers' tolerance of price
changes varies over time and ¯rms know about this (Rotemberg (2005)), that some costs
of changing prices are \free" (Midrigan (2008)), or that costs of production are subject
to leptokurtic disturbances (Midrigan (2008) and also Gertler and Leahy (2006)). These
channels may well be necessary to explain the observations even after the role of L1 is taken
into account. Still, it is interesting that costs of adjustment that depend on the size of the
price adjustment can also contribute to the variability of price changes.10
This e®ect is particularly stark in the case of the illustrative parameters considered in
column 4 of Table 2. By raising L1 so that it equals 1.0 and simultaneously raising ¾a to
the value of .19, one obtains signi¯cantly more volatile changes in the size of price increases.
In particular, the fraction of price increases smaller than 3% is now 13% while that over
15% equals 19%. Prices are now considerably less rigid, since they adjust on average every
3 months. While helpful in raising the variability of prices, this example does not succeed
in reproducing the ¯ndings of Kashyap (1988). In particular, Kashyap (1988) ¯nds an even
larger proportion of small changes and longer durations of constant prices. Moreover, the
example in column 4 features many more price declines than are found by Kashyap (1988).
10While this paper is concerned with price changes as opposed to with the response of output to nominal
disturbances, it is worth noting that these issues are closely linked, particularly in models like Golosov and
Lucas (2007). Midrigan (2008), in particular, shows a mechanism through which a higher variability of price
changes is connected with a higher response of output to monetary shocks. The idea is that the timing of
relatively large price changes is una®ected by monetary policy because these changes are due to idyosincratic
cost shocks. Thus, the observation of relatively large price changes suggests that, as in Calvo (1983), the
timing of many price changes is insensitive to monetary shocks.
21The role of L1 in this example can be clari¯ed further by considering parameters that
allow a model with L1 = 0 to induce the same fraction of price increases under 3% and the
same fraction of price increases above 15% as those in column 4. The values of L0 and ¾a
that induce this, as well as the results of simulating a model with them, are displayed in
column 5 of Table 2. In some respects, these simulations turn out to be quite similar to
those obtained in column 4. In particular, the average size of price increases is the same and
the overall standard deviation of price changes is quite comparable.
The two simulations do di®er in one crucial respect, however, and this is the advantage
of considering a model with positive L1: the simulation with L1 = 1 has prices that change
much less frequently. The reason for this is the (relative) reluctance of ¯rms to lower prices
when L1 > 0. This cuts the frequency of price adjustment directly by reducing the number of
price reductions. It also cuts indirectly the number of price increases because price reductions
when L1 = 0 require subsequent price increases when a suddenly falls.
3 Preannouncing price increases
A rather di®erent challenge to the idea that ¯xed administrative costs of changing prices
explain price rigidity is the prevalence of price preannouncements. In the case of non-
storable goods, preannouncements do not a®ect the volume of transactions and are thus a
matter of indi®erence to ¯rms. Many goods are somewhat storable, however, and customers
who are informed that the price of a storable good will increase ought to attempt to purchase
in advance of this increase. Whether this is good or bad for ¯rms depends on whether it
is more pro¯table to sell at the low price prevailing just before an price increase or at the
higher level prevailing thereafter.
In Benabou's (1989) model, selling at the high price is always more pro¯table because
demand has an inverse L shape so the ¯rm's reset price is also the pro¯t maximum. In his
model, consumers bene¯t by buying in advance of price increases and ¯rms dampen this
speculation by randomizing over the time at which they change their price. It follows that
¯rms would certainly be harmed by announcing this timing in advance.
22In the Sheshinski-Weiss (1977) model, equation (7) with `0 = 0 implies that the ¯rm has
a higher payo® at the price after the price increase than before. The reason is simple: if
increasing a price did not increase current pro¯ts, the ¯rm would be better o® postponing
the cost of changing prices until this does raise pro¯ts. Indeed, (7) implies that the pro¯t
increase must be large enough to o®set the bene¯ts (in terms of the time value of money)
of postponing the increase slightly. This pro¯t increase implies that the ¯rm strictly prefers
selling at the new price to selling based on the same demand and the same cost at an earlier
price. Given a discount rate that equals the interest rate, the ¯rm is also worse o® selling
this quantity in advance.
The Sheshinski-Weiss (1977) model is most easily interpreted as one where the good is
nonstorable. It can also be interpreted as one where the good is storable but consumers are
totally inattentive so they focus only on their purchases for current use and act as if they
had no idea what price will be charged next. Preannouncements can then be interpreted
as ways of telling consumers that it is in their interest to store the item. According to this
interpretation, preannouncements are bad for ¯rms in the Sheshinski-Weiss model (1977).
To gain some perspective on the features of actual preannouncements, I searched for
\price increases," \announced" and \e®ective" in a publication that regularly carries such
notices, namely Business Wire. Con¯ning myself to the period 10/02 to 10/04 and ignoring
the stories that matched my search criteria but were actually concerned with other issues,
I found 44 stories pertaining to companies who made announcements of price increases. Of
these, 14 (32%) announced price increases over one month in advance, 25 (57%) announced
them less than one month in advance but over 10 days in advance and only 5 announced
that these would a®ect shipments that would take place in the next ten days.
Some of these preannouncements specify that the new prices will apply to shipments
beyond a certain date, so it is not entirely clear whether customers can place additional orders
and have these be shipped before the new price takes e®ect. Other stories are very speci¯c
on this point, however. When Maxell, a large supplier of devices that store information on
magnetic media, announced on December 2, 2003 that the price of its main products would
23rise by about 10% in February 2004, it explicitly said it was giving advanced warning so that
Maxell customers would have \su±cient time to incorporate the pricing change into their
future business planning." Similarly, the September 15, 2004 announcement by GrafTech
that it was increasing electrode prices explicitly stated this price increase would only apply
to orders received after October 1. More generally, announcements made with a large degree
of advance notice such as Kimberly-Clark's announcement in March 2004 that it would
increase its Kleenex prices by midsummer give customers the capacity to respond.11
I start by considering a simple variant of the model of Section 1 and show that, under
plausible circumstances, ¯rms that act altruistically would indeed avail themselves of the
opportunity to preannounce price increases. This deterministic model also clari¯es two
reasons why a ¯rm with ¯xed administrative costs of changing prices is loathe to preannounce.
The ¯rst is the time value of money implies that consumer demand is reduced by buying
earlier. The second is that optimal pricing ensures that the price after adjustment is more
pro¯table than the one before. Nonetheless, there are conditions under which preannouncing
is desirable for ¯rms whose adjustment costs are thereby reduced. After discussing these
conditions I turn to a model with random a, where the analysis is restricted to a calibrated
model based on Golosov and Lucas (2007). In particular, the analysis of stochastic a supposes
that costs of adjustment are ¯xed so that L1 = 0.
Preannounced price increases are assumed to lead a fraction ® of customers to consider
stocking up on the good one period before the actual price increases. Given that consumers
do not typically carry inventory and that future consumption is not substitutable for current
consumption, preannounced price reductions would not have an e®ect in this model, and are
thus ignored. Moreover, to simplify, I suppose that all customers act as if they are unaware
of impending price increases unless these are preannounced, so that a fraction ® of customers
accumulates inventories in response to these announcements and the rest carry no inventory.
This is obviously an extreme assumption but provides a simple way to capture that not all
11While the intertemporal substitutability of the purchase of prepared co®ee might be subject to question,
it is interesting that Starbucks gave about 10 days notice before raising its prices in September 2004.
24consumers respond to temporary price discounts.
As suggested in Section 1, I now let the consumption of aware consumers at t, qt, be the
sum ^ qt + ~ qt where ~ qt is purchased at t while ^ qt is purchased at t ¡ 1 for t. Since there are
no inventory holding costs, aware consumers buy at the time when it is cheaper to do so.
Their access to a perfect borrowing market at rate i implies that buying at t ¡ 1 is cheaper
if pt¡1(1+i) < pt. If this condition is met, they buy all their time t consumption in advance
and otherwise they buy it at t.
In the model of section 1, prices are either constant or they change by a factor (1 + ¹)J
where J is the period of price rigidity. Thus aware consumer only buy in advance in the
period right before a price increase and do so only if (1 + ¹)J > (1 + ¹)=½ where I have
used (8) to substitute for (1+i). This condition is fairly weak, however, so we would expect
consumers to want to stock up in this context. If consumers do purchase in advance, their
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and their welfare from buying the good is (pt¡1=½pzt¡1)1¡µ=(µ ¡ 1).
Ignoring costs of changing prices, a ¯rm acting as if it were altruistic would behave as if
its real payo® at t ¡ 1 from selling to these consumer were equal to
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25where the equality is based on (10). If, instead, it sells all its goods for t at time t, the
present value of its bene¯ts as of t ¡ 1 is ½W(pt=pzt). Since ½µ < ½, the expression in (17) is
lower when W(pt=pzt) is equal to W(pt¡1=pzt¡1). The reason is that, even if these W's were
the same, the ¯rm would sell less in period t ¡ 1 because consumers have to pay the real
interest rate to carry the goods forward in time. Moreover, in all the simulations I conducted
with the model of section 1, the value of W in the period before price adjustment was below
that in the period with the new price. Thus, if ¯rms adjust their prices at t, W(pt¡1=pzt¡1)
is less than W(pt=pzt). This is what one would expect given the analytic result in (7).
This establishes that preannouncements that lead to advance purchases are not attractive
to ¯rms that face administrative costs of changing prices (i.e. costs that are not reduced by
the preannouncement itself). The next step is to study whether a ¯rm would be willing to
preannounce if it could thereby save some of its consumer's, and thus indirectly its own,
regret costs. It seems reasonable to suppose that customers who are able to buy at the
earlier price should not experience any regret (and may instead experience additional utility
from having obtained better terms than less aware consumers). I thus focus on the case
where the preannouncement eliminates a fraction ® of the regret costs (which are incurred
when the price changes at t, as before). In this case, preannouncing is worthwhile, so that
no equilibrium without preannouncements exists, if
½(W(S) ¡ L(¹
J ¡ 1)) < ½
µW(S=(1 + ¹)
J¡1) (18)
For the cases analyzed in Figures 2-4, this conditions is always satis¯ed. The reason is
that the adjustment costs L in these plots are depicted as fractions of revenue, which implies
that they are large relative to W. A key reason these adjustment costs appear so large is
that they are being compared to daily revenue. Because goods can only be inventoried for
one period, what is being studied here is whether ¯rms would be willing to announce their
prices with enough advance warning to let people buy at the old price the goods that they
would consumer the next day. The cost of this is low relative to the cost of adjustment.
It could also be argued that preannouncing price increases by one day would lead only
26a small number of customers to buy in advance so that ® is small and the bene¯ts of this
policy are small as well. Perhaps for this reason, preannouncements tend to involve somewhat
longer periods. To incorporate this into the model, I run it again while treating each period
as being a month long (i.e. by changing the period discount and in°ation rates). For this
analysis, L1 is set equal to zero.
In this monthly model (18) continues to be satis¯ed for products whose price changes
are equal to either 9.9 or 23.5%. On the other hand, the condition is violated for products
that change price every year so that their price change equals 2.4% when in°ation is 2.4%.
The reason for these contrasting results is that L0 is substantially smaller when prices are
rigid for only one year. Once L0 is small, the ¯rm has less to gain by preannouncing its price
increases.
When condition (18) is satis¯ed, there is no equilibrium without preannouncements. This
means, however, that the equilibrium that does exist satis¯es somewhat di®erent equations.
The reason is that, when setting its new price, the ¯rms has to recognize both that only a
fraction 1 ¡ ® of its customers buy in the ¯rst period and that a fraction ® of its customers
buy in the last period for consumption one period hence. Thus, the ¯rm's present discounted
value of bene¯ts from setting a price of S every J periods becomes
U =
D1S1¡µ ¡ D2S¡µ ¡ ½J(1 ¡ ®)L






























The optimization of U yields a reset price S equal to µD2=(1 ¡ µ)D1 and this can be
plugged back into (19) to obtain the optimal J. For small enough values of ®, the resulting
optimum is very close to the one obtained without preannouncements, so that (18) continues
to hold and there are indeed preannouncements each time the price is changed.
27I now let technology be random once again and let at follows the process in (14). Prean-
nouncing price increases for t+1 at t now has the obvious disadvantage that the ¯rm knows
its marginal cost of production at t but does not know it for t+1. To see that this is indeed
a disadvantage, imagine that the good is non-storable and that the cost of changing prices
for t+1 is the same whether this is announced before or after the ¯rm knows at+1. It is then
obvious that the ¯rm prefers to do it afterwards, where it still has the choice of charging the
price it would have chosen at t and will typically prefer to deviate from this choice.
In spite of this disadvantage, consumer's ability to store the good at t for consumption
at t + 1 can make preannouncing price increases more attractive when a is random. This is
true, in particular, when a ¯rm expects its future costs to be higher than its current costs.
By preannouncing a price increase this ¯rm induces more customers to buy while its costs
are relatively low, and this can be pro¯table. Notice that this preannouncement is only
attractive if a ¯rm ¯nds itself simultaneously with low costs and a desire to raise prices, a
combination which may not manifest itself very frequently. To obtain an estimate of this
frequency, I study how often this occurs in simulated settings.
I focus, in particular, on ¯rms whose environment is described by the model of section 2.
For these ¯rms, I consider two issues. The ¯rst is whether they would like to deviate from the
equilibrium considered in Section 2 by announcing some future price increases in advance.
The second is the extent to which they do announce prices in advance in an equilibrium
model where this is possible.
I ¯rst consider a deviation that is temporary in the sense that a ¯rm considers making
one price preannouncement at t ¡ 1 but plans to return to the optimal policy computed in
Section 2 thereafter. If the ¯rm announces announces a price for t that exceeds (1 + i)pt¡1,
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t + 1, the ¯rm returns to the optimal policy and is free to make new price changes. This
means that the present value of its bene¯ts as of t + 1 is V (pt=pzt+1;at+1), where this value






















where Et¡1 takes expectations based on information available at t¡1. Equation (14) implies
that at¡1 contains all available information at t¡1 about both at and at+1, and this in turn
implies that ^ V depends on at¡1. Moreover, the value of pt=pzt that maximizes this expression,
which is denoted by ^ St also depends exclusively on at¡1. Thus, deviating by preannouncing














> ½^ Lt: (20)
where the adjustment cost ^ L for prices announced at t ¡ 1 for t is paid at t. An equilib-
rium without preannouncements exists only (20) is violated for all combinations of at¡1 and
pt¡1=pzt¡1 that are reached in equilibrium. Figure 7 shows the left and right hand side values
of this inequality for several parameter values. Rather than depicting the left hand side for
all possible values of the relative price pt¡1=pzt¡1, it does so only for those relative prices
that make the left hand side as large as possible (for the given value of a). Not surprisingly,
this value obtains for relative prices pt¡1=pzt¡1 that are close to the values that lead ¯rms to
raise prices at t ¡ 1 if preannouncements are impossible.
Figure 7 draws the left hand side of (20) for the baseline parameters of Section 2 so that
L0 = :0285 and ¾a = :0528, and these are labeled as being the bene¯ts of preannouncing
prices. The ¯gure displays the e®ects of three illustrative values of ®, namely 0, .065 and
.15. These bene¯ts are upwards sloping in a because ¯rms with low a face currently high
costs so they gain relatively more by instituting their price increases immediately rather than
postponing them, whereas the opposite is true for ¯rms whose costs are temporarily low.
The ¯gure also shows several possible values of ^ L0. The simplest, of course, is L0 itself.
The line depicting this cost of adjustment is always above the bene¯t of preannouncement
when ® = 0. This illustrates the result we have already discussed, namely that ¯rms ¯nd it
costly to precommit to future prices when this does not reduce their costs of price adjustment
29and when customers do not take advantage of such preannouncements. While the bene¯ts
of preannouncement remain below ½L0 also when ® = :065, this is no longer true for high
values of a when ® = :15.
This demonstrates the bene¯t of inducing consumers to stock up when a is temporarily
high. It is worth noting, however, that there was no actual equilibrium outcome where
¯rms would have gained from these preannouncements in repeated simulations of 10 million
observations. The reason is that ¯rms very seldom, if ever, ¯nd themselves with prices that
are too low (so that they need to be raised) when a is high (so that costs are low).
Figure 7 also considers the case where preannouncements eliminate the regret costs of
consumers who buy in advance, so that ^ L is equal to (1 ¡ ®)L0. In this case, the maximum
bene¯ts of deviating by preannouncing exceed the costs of doing so for a larger range of a's.
Indeed, one can ¯nd such a's even for ® = :065, when such a's do not exist if adjustment
costs are independent of whether prices are announced in advance or not. Also, combinations
of prices and a such that preannouncements are worthwhile are now observed in simulations
when ® = :15. To understand how often ¯rms would actually preannounce, one must
construct an equilibrium where this is explicitly possible, and I do so now.
In such an equilibrium, pt¡1 is no longer relevant at t if the ¯rm has made a preannounce-
ment at t ¡ 1. I thus use the notation pt¡ to denote the price that the ¯rm has inherited at
t, where this equals pt¡1 if the ¯rm is free to change its price at t while it equals ^ pt, the price
announced for t at t¡1 otherwise. The value function for the ¯rm at t di®ers depending on
whether it is free to change its price for t or not. Let V u(pt¡1=pzt¡1;at) denote the value in
the former case while V c(^ pt¡=pzt¡1;at) in the latter. If the ¯rm does choose to preannounce
its price for t at t¡1 and if the size of preannouncement costs ^ Lt is independent of the size
of the announced price change, it announces the price that maximizes Et¡1V c(^ pt=pzt;at). It
thus sets ^ pt=pzt as a function of only at¡1, which contains all the information the ¯rm has
at t ¡ 1 about future a's. Let ^ S(at¡1) denote this optimal real price. while ^ V c(at¡1) is the
value of Et¡1V c(^ S(at¡1);at).














































































In these equations, the max¤ operator gives the maximum of the two terms in braces except
when pt¡=pzt is greater ^ S(at)=(1 + i). When it is greater, this operator equals the second
element in braces so that the gains from preannouncing accrue only when consumers ¯nd
buying at pt¡=pzt more attractive than waiting to buy at ^ S. These equations can be solved
by value function iteration. This involves using the existing value of V c and V u at each
iteration, ¯rst to compute ^ V c, and then using (21) and (22) to compute the next round of
V c and V u.
Once this procedure converges, one is left with two indicator functions Iu(pt¡1=pzt;at) and
Ic(p^ t=pzt;at). The ¯rst takes the value of 1 when the maximum in (21) is the ¯rst expression
so that a ¯rm that has not preannounced at t ¡ 1 preannounces at t, and is otherwise
zero. Similarly, the second takes the value of 1 when the maximum in (22) is the ¯rst
expression so that a ¯rm that has preannounced at t¡1 preannounces at t once again. One
is also left with the function F(pt¡1=pzt;at), which gives the real price pt=pzt that maximizes
W(pt=pzt;at) + ½EtV u(pt=pzt+1;at+1) ¡ Lt. Given these functions, it is straightforward to
simulate a sample path for pt.
To carry out this simulation, one can use an indicator variable Ia
t which takes the value




















































Using the same grid as in the case without preannouncements, the value and policy
functions for this problem were computed and used to simulate long sample paths for pt.
One key statistic that is informative about these sample paths is the ratio of the number of
times that Ia
t equals one (so that there is a preannouncement) to the number of times that
prices increase from t¡1 to t. This ratio is displayed for various parameter combinations in
Table 3.
The ¯rst line shows that, consistent with the impression given by Figure 7, preannounce-
ments do take place in equilibrium for the baseline parameters with ® = :15 when the costs
of adjustment are reduced by preannouncing the price. For these same parameters, there are
no observations with preannouncements when the costs of price adjustment are ¯xed. As ®
is increased to .2 in the second line, even ¯rms with ¯xed costs of adjustment preannounce
their price increases about one half of a percent of the time. Even then, the percent of
the time that price increases are announced is larger (about 2% of the time) if the costs of
adjustment is interpreted as a regret cost that is reduced by preannouncements.
The third line continues to let ® = :2 and considers the case where L0 = :125, the value
which eliminates price reductions in the analysis of Section 2. This higher L0 reduces prean-
nouncements both when adjustment costs are ¯xed and when they are variable. This result
stands in contrast to the results for constant a discussed above, where increases in adjust-
ment costs made preannouncements more likely when adjustment costs could be interpreted
as being the result of regret.
One way of reconciling these apparently con°icting results is shown in lines 4 and 5 of
Table 3. This considers the case with a lower standard deviation of ¾a, which brings the
results closer to those of constant a. These lines show that, when ¾a = :03, an increase in L0
from .0528 to .125 raise preannouncements considerably (from half a percent to 2% of price
increases). The variability of a thus a®ects the dependence of preannouncements on the size
32of adjustment costs.
In the case where L0 is relatively low, preannouncements become more common as a
becomes more variable because ¯rms are sometimes willing to raise prices when costs are
low, and it is attractive to preannounce such price increases. We saw earlier that, in spite of
a variable a, ¯rms become unwilling to cut prices as costs of adjustment increase, and this
also makes them reluctant to raise prices when costs are low (since such price increases would
have a large chance of being followed by a desire to reduce prices). As costs of adjustment
increase, such price increases become less common, and the corresponding preannouncements
wane as well. Thus, the variability of a induces preannouncements with low Lo that become
less common as Lo rises.
While this is not immediately apparent from line 3 in Table 3 the e®ects of increases in
L0 depend on the extent to which preannouncements reduce the size of adjustment costs.
In the case of regret costs that are reduced by preannouncements, it remains easy to ¯nd
parameters that lead ¯rms to announce price increases in advance when L0 = :125. All
that is necessary is to increase ® somewhat. Indeed, line 6 of Table 3 shows that such ¯rms
preannounce about one third of their price increases if ® is set equal to .3. By contrast, ®
needs to be greater than or equal to .9 to induce any preannouncements by ¯rms for whom
L0 is ¯xed, and the resulting fraction of price increases that are announced in advance is
in¯nitesimal. It equals .0001 for ® = :9 and reaches .0003 for ® = :999 (so that the ¯rm
makes e®ectively no sales in the ¯rst month in which the preannounced price prevails).
4 Conclusions
When ¯rm managers are asked why they keep their prices rigid, their predominant response
is that consumers react antagonistically to price changes (Blinder et al. (1988), Fabiani et
al. (2006)). At the same time, most of the formal literature deriving price rigidity from more
basic frictions has emphasized administrative menu costs that have no direct connection with
the psychological states of consumers. This paper suggests that this may be a mistake.
Administrative menu costs have three implications that seem problematic, at least for
33¯rms whose prices are su±ciently rigid that they seldom lower them. These are that they
imply that the size of price increases should rise substantially when in°ation rises, that
the volatility of price increases should be low and that ¯rms would rarely if ever voluntarily
encourage their customers to stock up products by announcing the date of a price increase in
advance. By contrast, these three aspects of price adjustment seem easier to rationalize if one
interprets costs of adjustment as being due to the regret experienced by consumers as they
face price increases. Moreover, the notion that consumers su®er losses from price adjustment
¯ts well with the idea that consumers complain when they observe price increases. These
complaints are to be expected if, as in Rotemberg (2004), consumers regard it as unfair when
¯rms fail to act somewhat altruistically towards them.
The model of consumer psychology considered here, and of the transmission of consumers'
psychological costs to ¯rms, is still fairly crude. This re°ects in part the lack of a consensus
on how to model social preferences and how to model emotions that are not directly related
to the amounts that people consume. Still, the suggestion that psychological considerations
of this sort may help explain empirical pricing practices will hopefully encourage further
research on these issues.
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37Table 1
In°ation and ¯xed costs of price adjustment
1 2 3 4
In°ation rate (% annual) 2.4 10.0 2.4 10.0
L0 (Fixed adjustment cost) .0285 .0285 .125 .125
¾a (S.D. of shocks) .0528 .0528 .0528 .0528
Overall adjustment frequency (%) 8.2 10.7 2.0 5.0
Fraction of increases .65 .85 1.0 1.0
Mean price increase (%) 9.9 11.0 9.9 15.9
S.D. of price increases .027 .024 .016 .027
Fraction increases < 3% 0 0 0 0
Fraction increases >15% .04 .06 .002 .60
38Table 2
Variable costs of price adjustment: the e®ect of varying the parameters
1 2 3 4 5
In°ation rate (% annual) 2.4 2.4 10.0 2.4 2.4
L0 (Fixed adjustment cost) .0285 .0390 .0390 .0017 6.2e¡6
L1 (Slope of adjustment cost) .5 .5 .5 1.0 0
¾a (S.D. of shocks) .0528 .097 .097 .19 .104
Overall adjustment frequency(%) 3.5 8.7 10.6 33.7 94.0
Fraction of increases .988 .65 .85 .61 .49
Mean price increase (%) 5.8 9.9 10.6 9.5 9.5
S.D. of price increases .013 .031 .032 .072 .070
Fraction of increases < 3% 0 0 0 .13 .13
Fraction of increases >15% 0 .07 .12 .19 .19
Table 3
Proportion of price increases that are preannnounced
Parameters Proportion
® L0 ¾a with ¯xed with regret
cost cost
1 0.15 0.0285 0.0528 0 0.005
2 0.2 0.0285 0.0528 0.0037 0.02
3 0.2 0.125 0.0528 0 0.01
4 0.2 0.0285 0.03 0 0.005
5 0.2 0.125 0.03 0 0.83
6 0.3 0.125 0.0528 0 0.32
7 0.6 0.125 0.0528 0 0.91
8 0.9 0.125 0.0528 0.0001 *
Note: * denotes that convergence was not achieved in value function iteration
39Figure 1: Continuous time model of ¯xed adjustment cost
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40Figure 2: Size of price increases as one varies in°ation and L1. The case where prices are
raised 23.5% under 2.4% in°ation






































41Figure 3: Size of price increases as one varies in°ation and L1. The case where prices are
raised 9.9% under 2.4% in°ation








































42Figure 4: Size of price increases as one varies in°ation and L1. The case where prices are
raised 2.4% under 2.4% in°ation







































43Figure 5: The e®ect of raising in°ation from 2.4 to 10% on the size of price increases for
¯rms that di®er in their frequency of adjustment at 2.4% in°ation



































































4Figure 6: Policy functions with L1 = 0 and L1 = :5




















































5Figure 7: Bene¯ts and costs of deviating by preannouncing price increases
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